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Hugh Everett III occupies a peculiar place in the history of physics, famous for his sole 
contribution, the idea that quantum theory can best be understood as describing many 
equally real alternative worlds corresponding to the different possible classical outcomes 
arising from quantum events.   It is an idea which Everett himself was never able properly 
to develop, which remains ill-understood, and may indeed not even make rigorous sense,  
but which nonetheless has greatly influenced modern developments in theoretical physics.  
In a romantic world, Everett might have struggled through hardship to develop and 
champion his version of quantum theory, and emerged ultimately vindicated -- perhaps 
even today giving colloquia and inspiring younger generations to ask fundamental 
questions and pursue their ideas despite setbacks.  In prosaic fact, although encouraged 
and supported by his PhD supervisor, John Archibald Wheeler, and offered opportunities to 
pursue a good academic career, he unromantically chose to spend the rest of his life 
making a mostly comfortable living as a software developer and military consultant, 
focussing particularly on developing optimal strategies for the US to deter and/or fight a 
large-scale nuclear war.     He published nothing on quantum theory beyond his PhD work.  
While he was gratified when his ideas eventually began receiving wider attention, he 
seems to have cared surprisingly little about either the fate or the ultimate validity of his 
view of quantum theory.   He died sadly early, in 1982, aged 51, of a heart attack to which 
his chain smoking, alcoholism, fondness for rich food and depression most likely 
contributed, leaving his wife, Nancy, with instructions to throw his ashes in the trash (which 
she eventually did) and two children, Liz and Mark, to whom he was more enigma than 
parent.     
David Deutsch, one of the founders of the theory of quantum computing -- and one 
younger physicist who definitely was directly inspired by Everett, through lectures and 
conversations at the University of Austin in 1977 -- is quoted on the back cover as 
describing Everett as one of the finest minds of the twentieth century.   One of the virtues 
of Peter Byrne's thoughtful biography is that it refrains from this sort of crude intellectual 
mythology.   On the contrary, Byrne is a refreshingly unhagiographic populariser: he sees 
the intellectual history of many-worlds quantum theory as often determined more by the 
complex agendas and personal loyalties of the participants than by scientific or logical 
argument, and Everett, Wheeler, Petersen, Rosenfeld and even (whisper it) Bohr emerge 
as sometimes confused actors, as well as less than saintly ones.    
Byrne's account reinforced my impression from Everett's two published papers on 
quantum theory that, judged by the very highest scientific standards, he was actually a 
somewhat impatient and un-self-critical thinker.   He groped around the key questions of 
how (if) distinct worlds can be said to emerge from a universal wave function, and what (if 
anything) probability can mean in such a picture, without ever carefully addressing them or 
acknowledging the large gaps in his arguments that others pointed out and that many 
theorists sympathetic to his ideas have subsequently tried to fill.   One of the remarkable 
discoveries Byrne reports is  Everett's personal copy of DeWitt and Graham's 1973 
volume, "The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics", found by a 
correspondent in a second-hand bookshop.    It contains some notably intemperate 
annotations -- "bullshit", "Goddamit (sic) you don't see it", and so forth -- scrawled on the 
work of some of his leading supporters.   
Perhaps one should not read too much into the possibly alcoholic marginalia of the later 
Everett, but they do fit into a lifelong pattern of resistance to thoughtful criticism.  Like a 
lazy student who knows the solution he is supposed to derive but struggles to justify it, 
Everett  had a convenient tendency to conflate difficult questions about quantum theory 
with easier ones.   Instead of explaining how we can derive the appearance of a single 
world following standard quantum probabilistic laws from many-worlds quantum theory, he 
offered a proof that a probability-like function defined on branching worlds must take the 
familiar form of the Born rule if it satisfies some mathematically appealing conditions -- not 
a completely trivial question, to be sure, but much easier than, and only tangentially 
relevant to, the one he claimed to be solving.    Nor did he tackle the key question of how 
to justify  basing an interpretation on a very particular decomposition of the universal wave 
function, picking out a basis in which it takes the form of a superposition of many worlds 
like ours which are well approximated by classical theories and contain creatures like us 
that perceive and exploit this classical predictability.    He simply took this preferred basis 
decomposition as given and then analysed how memory record states would be 
appropriately correlated with one another and with environment states -- indeed a sensible  
point to check if one can resolve the preferred basis problem, but not a substitute for a 
solution.   
Everett's ideas here seem, incidentally, to have been quite different from those of his 
modern supporters.  Byrne digs out an intriguing 1962 conference transcript recording 
Everett and Podolsky agreeing that the number of distinct worlds in the universal wave 
function should be not just infinite, but uncountably infinite.   Everett here seems to take 
literally the picture outlined in a toy model in his thesis, in which literally every possible 
value of the position coordinate of any given measured particle corresponds to a distinct 
world, whereas modern Everettians mostly envisage a large finite or countably infinite 
number of distinct (albeit, they say, fuzzily defined) worlds defined (they argue) by the 
physics of decoherence.   
Byrne gives us some fascinating and illuminating descriptions of Everett's thesis work, 
Wheeler's influence on Everett's presentation, and their subsequent unsuccessful attempts 
to interest Petersen, Bohr and the Copenhagen school in Everett's ideas, of Everett's 
occasional later forays into academic debate, and his eventual championing by DeWitt, 
Deutsch and others.     Alongside this, the book gives a vivid account of what became 
Everett's main career, beginning from work on game theory at Princeton and 
becoming a significant player as a military-industrial-governmental Cold War strategist.   
Byrne uses the life stories of Nancy and Hugh Everett to reconstruct the social and political 
climate of that era.   There is much fascinating, if chilling, material in these chapters on the 
uses and abuses of game theory in war planning, the inhuman but seemingly inescapable 
logic that led to the development of mutual assured destruction as an official strategic goal, 
and the bloodthirsty psychopathy of Herman Kahn and some other influential American 
strategists (surely, it should be said, more than matched by their Russian counterparts, 
although this comparison goes beyond Byrne's scope).   
One might perhaps imagine a biographer with Byrne's reportorial curriculum vitae, which 
includes contributions to Mother Jones, SF Weekly and the North Bay Bohemian, could 
end up depicting Everett as a monster.    His flaws are indeed brought out clearly -- 
perhaps most of all, his sad and disturbing detachment from both humane and scientific 
values.    Everett wanted a PhD thesis from Princeton, and the idea of a many-worlds 
interpretation became his route to one.   He wanted a career that would give him a 
financially comfortable lifestyle: Cold War strategist fitted the bill.   It is hard to find 
evidence in this biography that he ever really cared much about advancing our 
understanding of nature, the outcome of the Cold War, the fate of the tens of millions 
whose lives were variables in his calculations, the happiness of his family, or, in fact, 
anything at all.   
Yet, as Byrne suggests in his introduction, the book also often inclines towards 
understanding and forgiveness.    And credit is due: Everett's thesis work did offer a 
completely fresh perspective on quantum theory, which the greatest contemporary 
physicists were mostly too rigidly dogmatic or unimaginative to appreciate, and so failed to 
respond adequately to.   As Byrne's fascinating extracts from correspondence and 
dialogues between Everett, Wheeler and the Copenhagen school vividly illustrate, making 
sense of quantum theory is, unfortunately, something that human beings are just not very 
good at.   We seem to be too easily driven by the discomfort of uncertainty and 
puzzlement to seize on partial truths and incomplete ideas and stiffen them into articles of 
faith.   It seems unlikely to me that Everett's vision of many-worlds quantum theory will 
ever be made into a coherent scientific theory capable of explaining experimental data, but 
it was unquestionably liberating in helping to take theoretical physics beyond Copenhagen 
doctrine, and I think it will ultimately be seen as thus having significantly contributed to 
advancing our understanding of quantum theory and of nature.   Most of us would be 
happy enough with such a scientific epitaph.    
Everett's human failings should also be seen in perspective.   They were clearly many, but 
not egregiously uncommon.   He was not the first or last scientist to treat science as a 
game, or to abandon pure science for a materially comfortable career of questionable 
social value.   Nor does he seem to have been a particularly atypical Cold War careerist.   
And, terrifying though some of his and his colleagues' attitudes and calculations were, one 
has to be adult about the nature of their work: planning and preparation for possible 
nuclear war were almost inevitable given post-1945 geopolitics, and many better scientists 
with stronger consciences -- and in some cases more idealistic motivations -- than Everett 
worked to develop weapons and strategies.    If the experience of World War II and the 
Cold War taught us anything about how to avoid destroying ourselves with nuclear or 
biological weapons in future, it is surely to focus on the underlying dynamics of conflicts 
rather than hoping we will be saved by miraculously aligned mass moral decisions to resist 
among the scientists on both sides.   
Sadly, too, Everett was not so very unusual in having found it hard to form close human 
relationships -- a difficulty to which his family background and the nature of his work both 
probably contributed.    Everett's later personal and professional lives show how much 
harm a game-theoretic model of life, devoid of humane values, can cause, and maybe the 
main interest of this part of his story is in reinforcing awareness of this vulnerability.  His 
son, Mark Oliver Everett, records in a foreword coming to some understanding for, 
forgiveness of, and identification with his father through helping Byrne's work on this 
biography, and it is easy to respect these feelings.  Perhaps it is more appropriate to feel 
sorry for Everett, and to try to learn lessons from his life, than to judge.   
Byrne has not written -- or I think tried to write -- a definitive intellectual history of many-
worlds quantum theory, nor a completely authoritative biography.   He superimposes his 
own judgements, personal and political, a few of which jar: for example "Pure science was 
not, in Einstein's view, an end in itself." (p. 10), or the perhaps more plausible, but to my 
mind over-confidently reductive, declaration that "[Everett's] inability to resolve his 
ambivalent feelings toward [his mother] festered, causing him to distrust humanity for 
reasons he could not fully explain." (p. 24)   The book is also blemished by Oxford 
University Press' unforgivably careless copy editing.   While occasionally this amuses -- 
the surreal image of discomforted heteronormative eels conjured up by "conventional 
sexual morays" on p. 44 was a highlight -- cumulatively the misspellings and other 
solecisms grate.   If publishers want to preserve a niche for that endangered species, the 
printed book, they need to take much greater care in their work.   
Byrne's narrative nonetheless compels serious attention, contains much important new 
material, is greatly enlivened and enhanced by his eagle eye for the telling quotation, and 
is always interesting and often convincing.  It should intrigue any student of twentieth 
century physics, and is also a valuable resource for anyone concerned with the broader 
education of scientists and the impact narrowly scientific ways of thinking can have on 
scientists themselves and on the wider world.   
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